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Civil Practice

a m a t i v e defenses.

Recent decisional law by the Court of Appeals has placed new
limits on the applicability of article 14-A to some assumption of
risk cases,216to matters involving some labor law violations,a1° and
to violations of legal prohibitions.l17 These limitations are important to the practitioner representing clients who seek to benefit
from New York's comparative negligence statute.
Article 14-A was enacted upon the recommendation of the Judicial Conference218by chapter 69 of the Laws of 1975 and became
effective on September 1, 1975.219This article adopts the doctrine
of pure comparative negligence;220its purpose is to permit a partial

** This section was contributed by Jay C. Carlisle, Assistant Professor of Law, Pace
University School of Law; A.B., UCLA, 1965; J.D., University of Califomin, 1969. Professor
Carlisle is the revision author for W E I N S T E I N - K O RNEW
N - ~YORK
~ CIVILPrucnce (articles 13,14A, 15.30 and 78).
215. See Arbegast v. Board of Educ of South New Berlin Central School, 65 N.Y.2d
161,480 N.E.2d 365,490 N.Y.S.2d 751 (1985); hfaddox v. City of New York, 66 N.Y.2d '270,
487 N.E.2d 553,496 N.Y.S.2d 726 (1985); infra notes 229-66 and nccompmying text.
216. Z i i e r v. Chemung County Performing Arts, Inc, 65 N.Y.2d 513,482 N.E.2d $98,
493 N.Y.S.2d 102 (1985); infra notes 267-71 and accompanying text.
217. Barker v. Kallasb, 63 N.Y.2d 19, 468 N.E.2d 39, 479 N.YS.2d 201 (19&0; infra
notes 272-73 and accompanying text.
218. See Report of the Judiciol Conference of the State of New York to the 1915 Legislature, reprinted in TWENTY-FIRSTANN. REP. N.Y. Jm. C O N P E R ~232
N C(1976).
~
The Judicial Conference recommended that the provisions enacting a system of comparative negligence be inserted in the General Obligations Law, not in the CPLR See id. a t 239.
219. Act of May 6,1975, ch. 69,1975 ~ICKINNEY'S
SESSION
LAWS
OF NEWYO= 94 (cadified a t N.Y. CPLR 1411 (McKinney 1976)).
220. With the passage of Article 14-A, New York has joined the rapidly growing number of states that have adopted some form of comparative negligence. The doctrine of comparative negligence has assumed a variety of guises, four of which may be briefly outlined.
Under the "slight-gross" system, if the plaintiffs negligence is slight when compared to
that of the defendant, the plaintiff may recover a judgment, but his dnrnnges (as under dl
the systems of comparative negligence) will be d i i i h e d by the percentnge of the fault
attributable to him. If the plaintiffs negligence is more than "slight," however that term
may be defined, then he may not recover for any of his damages. A second approach is to
allow the plaintiff to recover if is negligence is less than fifty percent, or not more than
forty-nine percent, of the total negligence of the parties contribution to
dnmnges. In
some states, the plaintiff's contributory negligence is not a bar to recovery if such negligence
is not greater than the negligence of the person against whom recovery is sought. Finnlly,
there is the system of pure comparative negligence that allows o pparty o recovery h p tive of whether he is more negligent than the defendant. For example, if o plnintia, who
suffered $100,000 in damages, is adjudged to have been, compared with the dofendant,
ninety-eight percent negligent, he will be entitled to recover S5000 from the defendant. See

~
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recovery for the plaints, even though the conduct of each party is
culpable.221Article 14-A applies to any action, accruing on or after
September 1, 1975,222for personal injury, injury to property, or
wrongful
These provisions require that the claimant's recovery be reduced to the degree that his own negligence or other
2 ~ ~ 14-A is applicable to
culpable conduct caused the i n j ~ y . Article
actions against a defendant for negligence, breach of warranty, and
strict liability.226
By adopting article 14-A, the Legislature specifically designated both assumption of risk and contributory negligence as culpable conduct to be considered in proportioning the comparative
fault of the parties.226Under CPLR 1411, the relationship of each
party's conduct to the injury, and the amount of damages that are
recoverable is based upon a comparison of conduct that the law
If the claimant's conduct was wrongful,
considers blame~orthy.2~~
but did not contribute to causing his injuries or to their aggravation, there is no diminution of the recoverable damages.226

A. Assumption of Risk
Although assumption of risk was designated by the Legislature
as culpable conduct to be considered in assessing the parties' comparative
neither article 14-A nor its legislative history defines "assumption of risk."230 In addition, CPLR 1411 left it "unclear whether express assumption of risk is subject to

WEINSTEIN-KORN-MILLER,
NEWYORKCIVILPRACTICE
$ 1411.01 (1986).
221. See Arbegast, 65 N.Y.2d a t 167, 480 N.E.2d a t 369,490 N.Y.S.2d a t 765.
222. See WEINSTEIN-KORN-MJUER,
CPLR MANUAL
$ 11.07 (1985 rev. ed,) [hereinaftor
cited as CPLR MANUAL].
223. N.Y. EPTL 5-4.2 and 11-3.2(b) were amended by chapter 69 of the Laws of 1976
to assure that the provisions of article 14-A relating to comparative negligence are applicable in wrongful death actions. See 1975 MCKINNEY'SSESSION
LAWSOF NEWYORK94.
supra note 222, $ 11.07.
224. See CPLR MANUAL,
225. See Report of the Judicial Conference of the State of New York to the 1976 Legislature, reprinted in TWENTY-FIRST
ANN.REP.N.Y. JUD.
CONFERENCE
a t 239; Memorandum
of Assemblyman Fink in support of 1975 Bill No. A417843277, reproduced in N.Y.L.J.,
supra note 222, $ 11.02.
Apr. 23, 1975, a t 7, col. 1; see ako CPLR MANUAL,
226. See Hoyt v. McCann, 88 A.D.2d 633,634,450 N.Y.S.2d 231, 232 (2d Dep't 1082);
see generally WEINSTEIN-KORN-MILLER,
supra note 220, $1411.03; see ako N.Y. CPLR 1411
(McKinney 1976).
227. See Arbegast, 65 N.Y.2d a t 168,480 N.E.2d a t 370,490 N.Y.S.2d a t 766.
228. See id. a t 168-69,480 N.E.2d a t 370-71,490 N.Y.S.2d a t 756-57.
229. See supra note 226 and accompanying text.
230. See Arbegast, 65 N.Y.2d a t 169, 480 N.E.2d a t 371,490 N.Y.S.2d a t 767.
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comparison."231 Recently, the Court of Appeals clarified this relationship in Arbegast v. Board of Educati0n.2~~
In Arbegast, the plaintiff was thrown from a donkey while
playing donkey ba~ketball.2~~
Prior to mounting the donkey, the
plaintiff was informed by the defendant that she was participating
at her own risk?= The Court of Appeals held that it mas a complete defense to the plaintiff's cause of action that she expressly
agreed to assume the risk involved in the activity that caused her
inj~ry.2
The
~ ~Court stated that once a party gives express consent,
they are foreclosed from the use of CPLR 1411 and recovery is
barred.236The Arbegast Court made it clear, however, that if the
assumption of risk is not expressed, but is only implied from the
plaintiff's participation in the activity, then the comparative negligence principles of CPLR 1411 are applicable. The plaintiff, thus,
would be allowed to recover damages based upon a comparison of
each party's culpable conduct.237
In Arbegast, the Court noted: "[tlhe existence of such an express assumption of risk by the injured party is a matter of defense
upon which the burden of proof will be on the party claiming to
have thus been absolved of duty. and will be a factual issue for
the jury, unless there is no real controversy as to the facts."238 The
Court then observed that the plaintiff would have been entitled to
a comparative -causation charge on implied assumption of the risk
had she not conceded that she was told before the games began
that "participants are at their o m risk."23e The Court also ruled
that in light of that concession, the trial judge should have di-

..

231. See id. CPLR 1411does not address the issue of express assumption of risk, in fact
the section is merely entitled "[dlamages recoverable when contributory nqligcnco or assumption of risk is established." N.Y. CPLR 1411 (hfcKinney 1976).
232. 65 N.Y.2d 161,480 N.E.2d 365,490 N.Y.S.2d 751 (1985).
. 233. See id. a t 162,480 N.E.2d a t 366-67,490 N.Y.S.2d a t 752-53.
234. See id. a t 163,480 N.E.2d a t 367,490 N.Y.S.2d a t 753.
235. See id. a t 170,480 N.E.2d a t 371,490 N.Y.S.2d a t 757-58.
236. See id.
237. See id. a t 170, 480 N.E.2d a t 371, 490 N.Y.S.2d a t 751; see also Cowon, Tort
Law: Sports Injury-A New Concept of Risk Assumption, N.Y.L.J., Auyst 9, 1985, nt 1,
coL 1; Orzeske, Comparatiue Fault and Strict Products Liability, 8 J. PROD.
LIAR283,290
(1985).
238. Arbegast, 65 N.Y.2d a t 171,480 N.E.2d a t 372,490 N.YS.2d nt 753.
239. See id. The Court made a connection between express assumption of the risk and
an expression on the part of the defendant that the plaintiff partiu'pntes a t his o m risk. See
Conason, supra note 237, a t 2; infra notes 264-66 and accompanying text.
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rected a verdict for the defendant.2'O In specifically exempting express assumption of risk from CPLR 1411, the Court of Appeals
relied on the common law definition of express assumption. Under
the common law, an express assumption of the risk was held to
preclude any recovery. An advance agreement between the parties
specifically would state that the defendant did not owe the plaintiff a duty of reasonable care and the defendant would not be held
liable for any conduct that was subsequently labeled negligentea41
By enacting article 14-A, the Legislature intended New York's
comparative negligence statute to permit a recovery even though
The Arbegast Court
the conduct of both parties was ~ulpable.2'~
limited this intention by holding that the benefits of CPLR 1411
The
do not extend to parties who expressly assume the ri~k.2'~
practitioner should be aware that Arbegast has received further
the Court of
support. For example, in Santangelo v. State:"
Claims, relying on Arbegast, held that police officers could not recover for injuries sustained in apprehending a mental patient, who
escaped from a mental institution due to the State's negligence,
because as police officers, their activity was in the line of work for
e
which they had expressly assumed the r i ~ k . 2 ~ V hSantangelo
court extends the Arbegast holding by ruling that persons who
partake in inherently dangerous occupations would not be allowed
to take advantage of CPLR 1411.246
In Maddox v. City of New York,2" a professional baseball
player slipped and fell while playing at Shea Stadium, severely injuring his knee. Subsequently, Maddox had three knee operations
and was forced to prematurely end his professional career with the
New York Yankees. After suing a number of parties, Maddox testified a t a deposition that he was aware of the wet field and had
prior notice of the particular puddle in which he fell. Four of the

240. See Arbegast, 65 N.Y.2d at 171, 480 N.E.2d at 372, 490 N.Y.S.2d at 758.
241. See id. at 169, 480 N.E.2d at 371,490 N.Y.S.2d at 757.
242. See id. at 167,480 N.E.2d at 369,490 N.Y.S.2d at 755.
supra noto
243. See Conason, supra note 237, at 2; see also WEINSTEIN-KORN-MILLER,
220, 8 1411.03.
244. 129 Miic. 2d 898, 494 N.Y.S.2d 49 (Ct. C1. 1985).
245. See id. at 907, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 54.
246. See id.
247. 66 N.Y.2d 270, 487 N.E.2d 553,496 N.Y.S.2d 726 (1985). For a discussion o f tho
Second Department's decision in Maddox, see Taddeo, Catastrophic Sports Injuries and
the Law: Maddox v. City o f New York, et al., 194 N.Y.L.J., July 12, 1985, at 5, col. 1.
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defendants and other parties thus moved for summary judgment
on the ground that Maddox had assumed the risk. In response,
Maddox argued that he had only assumed the risk of the game, not
of the dangerous condition of the playing field.
Although the case involved an implied assumption of risk, as
opposed to an express agreement, the Court of Appeals affirmed
the Second Department's dismissal of the plaintiff's ~omplaint?'~
Although Maddox's cause of action accrued before the application
the decision might have a
of the comparative negligence stat~te,2'~
bearing on future cases where a knowledgeable person engages in
activity which he knows to entail the very risk resulting in his injury.260It would appear that the Arbegast holding is consistent
with the Court's analysis in Maddox.
The Arbegast and Maddox holdings may also affect the liability of one sports participant to another.2u1In Turcotte u. Fell,luaa
professional jockey was injured during a race due to the alleged
The court barred recovery on the
negligence of another j0ckey.2~~
grounds that the claimant knew of the dangers associated with the
sport and, by mere participation, agreed to relieve the defendant of
any duty owed to
The court stated that CPLR 1411 did not
apply because the defendant owed no duty of care to the plaintiff
2 ~is~significant to note
with respect to the injury-causing e ~ e n t . It

248. See Maddox, 66 N.Y.2d a t 279,487 N.E.2d a t 558,496 N.YS.2d a t 731.
249. See id. a t 275.487 N.E.2d a t 554,496 N.YS.2d a t 727 (the injury occuned on June
13, 1975); see ako Lamphear v. State, 91 kD.2d 791, 458 N.Y.S.2d 71 (3d Dep't 1982);
McDaniel v. Clarkstown Central School Dist, 111kD.2d 151,488 N.YS.2d 7&3 (2d Dep't
1985) (plainWs contributory negligence was a complete bar to recovery when the cause of
action accrued prior to New York's system of comparative negligence, but n clnim n d g
after September 1,1975, in this case for wrongful death, does create a triable issue as to the
degree of defendant's negligence).
250. See Hoenig, Product Liability, 195 N.Y.L.J., hfar. 27, 1986, a t 1, coL 1.
251. See Conason, supra note 237, a t 2.
252. 123 Misc 2d 877, 474 N.Y.S.2d 893 (Sup. Ct, Nassau Co. 1984).
253. See id. a t 877-78, 474 N.Y.S.2d a t 894.
254. See id. a t 883-84,474 N.Y.S.2d a t 897-98; see also Clapmnn v. City of New York,
63 N.Y.2d 669,468 N.E.2d 697,479 N.Y.S.2d 515 (1984) (the owner of a b = b d field only
has a duty to provide adequate screening behind home plate where the danger of beimg
struck by a ball is greatest). Accord Davidoff v. hletropolitan Baseball Club, 61 N.Y.2d 996,
463 N.E.2d 1219,475 N.Y.S.2d 367 (1984); Akins v. Glens Falls City School Dtt,53 N.Y.2d
325,424 N.E.2d 531,441 N.Y.S.2d 644 (1981). Compare 5 b i t o v. V i e of Albion, 100
kD.2d 739,473 N.YS.2d 651 (4th Dep't 1984) (an owner of a field had n duty to provide
adequate screening where the seat. were located because there were no seats locnted behind
home plate); Sawyer v. State, 127 Misc 2d 295,485 N.Y.S.2d 695 (Ct CL 1985).
255. See Turcotte, 123 hlisc 2d a t 884,474 N.YS.2d a t 896.
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that the issue of duty preceded any discussion of "culpable conduct."26eIn light of the Arbegast decision, it would seem viable for
a court, in a position similar to the Turcotte court, to allow a
claimant to take advantage of article 14-A as long as there is no
express assumption of the risk.267
Courts have also barred recovery of injured amateur sports
participants, but not on the Arbegast theory of an express assumption of risk. In Cimino v. Town of Hemp~tead:~~
the Second Department barred recovery by an injured swimmer who was struck
by a powerful w a ~ e . 2The
~ ~court found that the claimant had observed the turbulent water prior to the accident and still decided
to surf.2e0In another swimming case, the Court of Appeals barred
recovery by a swimmer injured when he dove onto a sandbar not
~ ~ Court held that the State
visible from the water's s u r f a ~ e . 2The
was not put on notice as to the dangerousness of the area because
very few accidents had occurred
In addition, the Court
prevented recovery because it determined that the claimant had
previously visited the area six times that ~ u m m e r . 2 ~ ~
Both decisions found that the defendants had no duty to
~ ~to the
warn, thus there was no basis for a negligence ~ l a i m . 2Due
fact that the plaintiffs in these cases could not establish a cause of
action, a decision could not be made as to the applicability of
CPLR 1411.266If, in fact, the defendants did owe a duty to forewarn and failed to do so, the Arbegast decision would suggest that,
at best, only an implied assumption of the risk existed in these
cases and CPLR 1411 would apply.2ee

256. See Conason, supra note 237, a t 2.
257. See id.
258. 110 A.D.2d 805,488 N.Y.S.2d 68 (2d Dep't 1985).
259. See id. a t 805, 488 N.Y.S.2d a t 69.
260. See id.
261. See Herman v. State, 63 N.Y.2d 822,472 N.E.2d 24,482 N.Y.S.2d 248 (1984).
262. See id. a t 823,472 N.E.2d a t 25,482 N.Y.S.2d a t 249.
263. See id.
264. See id.; Cimino, 110 A.D.2d a t 805, 488 N.Y.S.2d a t 70.
265. See Herman, 63 N.Y.2d a t 823, 472 N.E.2d a t 25, 482 N.Y.S.2d a t 249; see also
Clark v. Goshen Sunday Morning Softball League, 129 Misc. 2d 401,493 N.Y.S.2d 262 (Sup.
Ct., Orange Co. 1985) (plaintiff assumed the risk by virtue of attending a sporting ovont
even though he did not intend to view the game as a spectator).
266. See Conason, supra note 237, a t 2.
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B. Labor Law Violations
Notwithstanding CPLR 1411, a contractor or owner of a site is
strictly liable for any injuries which are caused by a violation of
certain safety provisions of the Labor Law. For example, in Zimmer v. Chemung County Performing Arts, In~.,2~'
the Court of Appeals held that plaintifPs contributory negligence was not subject
to comparison with the defendant's statutory violation of section
240(1) of the Labor La-dss because the Legislature intended its violation to establish absolute liability.2se The Court held that the
trial court should have directed a verdict in the plaintifPs favor
because there was no evidence at trial to support a finding that the
statutory violation was not a proximate cause of the injuries.270
Thus, comparative negligence principles are not applicable whenever statutory liability is held to be absolute and a plaintifPs recovery should not be affected by his own fault.271
C. Legal Prohibitions
There is also an absolute bar to recovery by a plaintiff whose
injuries were the direct result of a "serious violation" of a statute
prohibiting the conduct involved. For example, in Barker u. Katthe plaintiff was injured while unlawfully making a bomb.
Because of his knowing and intentional participation in a criminal
act, he could not recover for any portion of his injuries?7g

D. Conclusion
The practitioner should be alert for situations where decisional law bars the application of CPLR article 14-A. This is particularly true when a party admits to an express assumption of the
risk or when a "highly trained" party impliedly assumes the risk.

267. 65 N.Y.2d 513,482 N.E.2d 898,493 N.Y.S.2d 102 (1985).
268. See N.Y. LAB.LAW 3 240(1) (hIcKinney 1965 6:Supp. 1986).
269. See Zimmer, 65 N.Y.2d at 520-21,482 N.E.2d at 900-01,493 N.YS.2d nt 105.
270. See id. at 524,482 N.E.2d at 903,493 N.Y.S.2d at 107.
271. See id. Accord Wright v. State, 110 A.D.2d 1060, 488 N.YS.2d 917 (4th Dep't
1985) (which also distinguishes between the applicability of comparative negligence standards under N.Y. LABOR LAW33 240(1) and 241(6)). See ako Long v. Forest-Fehlhnber, 55
N.Y.2d 154,433 N.E.2d 115,448 N.Y.S.2d 132 (1982).
272. 63 N.Y.2d 19,468 NJ3.2d 39,479 N.YS.2d 201 (1984).
273. See id. at 28-29,468 N.E.2d at 43,479 N.YS.2d at 205-06.
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